PHIL 255: Week 10

Consciousness

Announcements

The final exam is scheduled for Dec. 21. Plan your travel accordingly.

• Much of this exam will be based on lectures. Web notes will cover only a small part of lecture material.

• The exam will be cumulative, in that the discussion of Churchland will build upon issues in Graham.

Essay topics are now available.

Powerpoint presentation: Hot Thought.

Churchland's responses to philosophical arguments

1. Consciousness is a mystery.

• Only if you don't try to explain it.

2. I cannot imagine how science could explain awareness.

• Improve your imagination.

3. There could be zombies.

• Logical possibilities are irrelevant: deadbies.

4. The problem is too hard.

• Try.

5. How can I know what you experience?

• The inverted qualia argument is empirically implausible.

6. Doesn't neuroscience leave something out? [what Mary knows argument]

• Having a true theory is different from the theory being true of you, which gives you a cognitive skill.

7. It is ridiculous to expect a reduction from the behavioral level directly to the neuronal level.

• Multiple levels of explanation.

8. Consciousness is not a neural effect but a subatomic effect.

• There is no evidence that consciousness is quantum mechanical.
• Is the brain a quantum computer? No.

9. Science cannot solve all problems.

• Try.

10. (Mine). Mechanistic explanations of consciousness undermine morality and happiness.

• Morality and the meaning of life are consistent with materialism.

Toward understanding consciousness

Look for theories, not definitions. E.g. fire.

Look for mechanisms of consciousness, not just neural correlates.

Crick: look for brain differences with onset of awareness: collective activity of distributed neurons.

Edelman: Re-entrant neural pathways (loops).

Baars: global workspace.

Damasio: self-representation.

• Build internal model, e.g. of physical states.

• Many brain areas: insula, cingulate, etc.

Allman: spindle neurons.

Thagard: emotional consciousness.

Phil 255

Computational Epistemology Laboratory.

Paul Thagard

This page updated Nov. 14, 2005