Philosophical positions: dualism, identity, functionalism, pansychism, enactivism, mysterianism.
Neurons, neural groups (populations, cell assemblies), firing.
Aims: neural correlates of consciousness, mechanisms, necessary and sufficient conditions.
Approaches: modularity vs. connectome.
1. What is the aim of the neuroscience of consciousness: correlates, mechanisms, or necessary and sufficient conditions?
2.Why is pain conscious?
3. Is the unity of consciousness illusory?
4. How is consciousness integrated?
5. What role does binding play in conscious experience?
6. Is consciousness a kind of action?
7. Can theories of neural representation accommodate philosophical theories that consciousness involves higher-level reperesentations?
8. What kinds of brain damage shed light on the nature of consciousness?
9. What does blindsight tell us about consciousness?
Human Connectome Project
Stewart and Eliasmith on limits of synchrony
Crick and Koch (2003)
Computational Epistemology Laboratory.
This page updated Oct. 7, 2013