1. Idealism: reality is mental.
2. Dualism: reality is mental and material; a person is a mind and a body.
3. Materialism: reality is matter and energy; minds are material.
We should not talk about minds and mental states, only about observed behavior.
2. Identity theory:
A mind is a brain. A mental state (e.g. a belief) is a brain state. A mental change is a brain process.
A mind is some kind of material state, not necessarily the brain. A belief is a functional state. Mind supervenes on matter.
Minds are material, but we should not try to explain minds, since folk psychology is false. There are no beliefs.
In everyday life we explain people's actions on the basis of their beliefs and desires. E.g. Fred went to the diner because he was hungry and believed that the diner has good food.
Paul Churchland claims that folk psychology is a theory, i.e. a set of explanatory hypotheses that might be false.
1. Identity theory: folk theory reduces to neuropsychology.
2. Dualism: no reduction is possible; folk psychology is about what souls do.
3. Functionalist: no reduction, because of multiple realizability.
4. Eliminativism: no reduction, because folk psychology is false, like folk theories in physics, biology, and medicine.
1. It fails to explain much of thinking, e.g. mental illness, creativity, etc. + Learning.
2. It has not progressed, unlike science.
3. Folk psychology is isolated from scientific explanations.
Reply: Much of folk psychology may be approximately true, e.g. talk of beliefs, desires, emotions.
So folk psychology should be revised, not eliminated.
|Behaviorism||deny||deny||deny or social||deny|
|Identity theory||causal||deny||social||brain process|
|Functionalism||causal||deny||social||physical process of different kinds|
|Eliminativism||causal||deny||social||deny or modify|
1. Finite modalities: 6 senses and stream of thought.
2. Unity: experiences are tied together.
3. Intentionality: we are conscious of things.
4. Subjective feeling: qualia (qualitative experiences)
5. "Only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have intentional states at all." p. 132.
6. Figure-ground, gestalt structure.
8. Overflow: reference beyond immediate content.
9. Center and periphery.
10. Boundary conditions.
12. Pleasure/unpleasure dimension.
1. Qualitative character is an impediment to materialism.
2. Skepticism about other minds: are they conscious?
3. Causal explanations, e.g.pain causes behavior.
4. Personal identity.
Nothing physical science can describe succeeds in capturing the red look of a ripe tomato. So, consciousness is not physical.
No matter how much science Mary knows, she doesn't understand conscious experience unless she has it.
Are animals conscious?
If they are, what are the consequences for morality?
Can we understand what it is like to be a bat? An eagle? A monkey?
Does the neurophysiology of animals suggest they have consciousness?
Qualitative experience is the causal result of physical processes, but does not causally influence physical processes.
Consciousness is real, but is an effect, not a cause.
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